The Kremlin denies, but sets facts

In a recent address at the influential Valdai Discussion Club – a forum comparable to the Council on Foreign Relations in the United States – Russian President Vladimir Putin said Moscow could resort to nuclear weapons if NATO tried to cut off the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The Kaliningrad exclave sits on the Baltic Sea and is separated from the rest of Russia and its ally Belarus by Poland and Lithuania. President Putin also ruled out a ceasefire in Ukraine under current conditions, even as Washington, Kyiv and other governments propose one.

We should not take these threats lightly, especially that of nuclear weapons.

NATO countries already face regular hybrid attacks. Cyberattacks and drone incidents are frequent, and airspace violations have occurred. In the cyber domain, Europe suspects foreign powers of collaborating with organized crime. Moscow denies involvement, although the origin of the drones and some cyberattacks is fairly clear. Provocations are increasing, and Europe is not responding forcefully enough.

President Putin’s remarks warrant close examination, and Russia’s past behavior shows why.

History shows that aggressive and vengeful dictators must be taken at their word when they threaten, even as they deny the obvious.

Prince Michael of Liechtenstein

When denial is part of the threat

Consider the polonium and Novichok attacks. Alexander Litvinenko was a former officer of Russia’s Federal Security Service who defected to the United Kingdom. He was murdered in 2006 with a dose of polonium-210, a rare and highly radioactive isotope that cannot be obtained without state backing. The radioactive trail led directly to Russia. Similarly, Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia were poisoned in 2018 with Novichok, a Russian-made nerve agent. Mr. Skripal was a double agent who had been sent to the UK in a prisoner exchange. Thanks to prompt treatment, both survived. The Kremlin immediately denied involvement in either case.

The pattern in both cases is revealing. Although Moscow flatly denied involvement, it wanted to send a clear message about what happens to traitors. The Kremlin is not concerned with the credibility of its denials. This is the reverse of the Western approach: During the Cold War, Western governments sought “plausible deniability” for certain covert operations.

The Kremlin has no interest in a ceasefire until it achieves all its objectives, which extend well beyond Ukraine. It is also pushing NATO back from its borders – not necessarily through further direct invasion, but through covert and hybrid activities. Europe must respond assertively. Only counterattacks can stop hybrid attacks. The victim of aggression must show that its retaliation will hurt the aggressor at least as much as the original attack.

Moscow’s nuclear edge

Although Russia has learned much about modern warfare in Ukraine, a conventional war with NATO would carry great risk for Moscow. However, in nuclear capabilities, particularly smaller tactical weapons, Russia holds a clear advantage in Europe. It is highly doubtful that the U.S. would enter a nuclear conflict with Russia if limited tactical strikes were carried out in Ukraine or the Baltics.

We should therefore not ignore President Putin’s remark about using nuclear weapons. Because the Kremlin cares little about the plausibility of its claims, it could easily stage an incident that appears to show a NATO blockade of Kaliningrad. In Western democracies, we have learned not to take politicians’ declarations seriously. Yet history shows that aggressive and vengeful dictators must be taken at their word when they threaten, even as they deny the obvious.