Trump’s Venezuela oil deal will expand state interventionism
How Washington took control of Venezuela’s oil deal
When the Trump administration struck the agreement with Venezuela, it did not merely secure access to crude; it put the US government directly into the oil business. Under the agreement, North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), a little-known Barbados-based company, will receive rights to develop 17 fields containing an estimated 65 billion barrels. The Pentagon will receive a 35% stake in NABEP’s parent company, while the State Department can purchase 20% of production at cost and has first refusal over the remainder. Washington can also veto board appointments, most directors must be American citizens, and US law will govern the agreement.
These provisions make the US government a shareholder, a privileged buyer, and a powerful corporate overseer. If those estimates are accurate, the Pentagon would become a major shareholder in the world’s second-largest corporate holder of proven oil reserves after Saudi Aramco. The Venezuela venture fits a wider pattern: the Trump administration has already acquired equity in 31 private companies, signaling a broader shift from free enterprise toward state corporatism.
Such an expansion of government power demands exceptional transparency and legal clarity. Yet the negotiations were conducted in secret, NABEP was selected without competition, and no complete contract has been published. Even the agreement’s duration is disputed: Washington describes a 100-year concession, while unelected interim president Delcy Rodríguez says it will last only 25 years.
Its legal foundation is equally uncertain. In Venezuela, the agreement appears not to have received the National Assembly’s constitutionally required approval. In the US, the administration has not identified the authority allowing the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital—created mainly to provide loans and guarantees—to acquire equity in a foreign oil company.
Beyond legality lies a deeper problem of democratic legitimacy. Rodríguez was not elected president, and the current legislature emerged from elections widely criticized as neither free nor fair. After Maduro’s removal, Washington presented a three-stage plan culminating in free elections. Yet the oil deal reverses that order by granting long-term concessions before establishing a legitimate government.
This may give Rodríguez and Trump a shared interest in delaying democracy: she relies on American support, while Trump relies on her government to preserve the deal. But only an elected government can give such an agreement lasting legitimacy. By securing oil rights bef
Why the deal will not deliver cheap gasoline
The deal rests on a simple promise: Venezuelan oil will lower American gasoline prices. But underground reserves are not barrels ready for sale. Bringing them to market requires capital, repaired fields, electricity, pipelines, storage, ports, and refining capacity, along with confidence that future governments will respect contracts and investments.
That confidence is absent. Venezuela previously seized investments belonging to ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, forcing both to pursue compensation through international arbitration. ExxonMobil chief executive Darren Woods has called the country “uninvestable” without fundamental legal and commercial reforms. ConocoPhillips remains reluctant to return until it recovers the billions it is owed, while Chevron is the only main American oil major willing to expand.
Their hesitation is a rational response to Venezuela’s institutional risks. Companies with the capital, technology, and experience to develop these reserves do not trust its legal and political environment. Instead of making secure property rights and credible courts the foundation for renewed investment, Washington is betting that its own ownership stake will reassure investors.
Political backing cannot overcome economic reality. Restoring Venezuelan output to three or four million barrels per day could take four to ten years, meaning additional supplies would reach global markets only gradually and have little near-term effect on prices. Much of Venezuela’s oil is also heavy and sour, making it costlier to extract and refine and poorly suited for direct storage in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Trump himself disparaged Venezuelan crude in 2023 as “tar” and “the dirtiest, the worst oil probably anywhere in the world.”
These economic realities point to a broader lesson: Venezuela’s oil industry needs market institutions, not another state-backed enterprise. Meaningful reform must begin with free elections and rest on secure property rights, independent courts, transparent contracts, and open competition. Washington should support those conditions rather than choose a favored company and become its shareholder. Replacing control from Caracas with control from Washington merely changes who distributes the privileges. Cheaper energy cannot be decreed into existence; it comes from competing firms risking their own capital to bring resources to consumers.
























