The intrinsic contradictions of conservative liberalism: On the irreconcilability of liberalism and conservatism

13.08.2026

“Conservative liberalism” is a hybrid political tendency that seeks to construct a balanced synthesis between liberty and tradition, market and state, individualism and social convention. Although liberals and conservatives have often formed tactical alliances in the domain of public policy, at the level of theoretical foundations, they are generally understood as two divergent intellectual traditions. It is precisely this tension that causes conservative liberalism to suffer from profound internal contradictions, often leading to division and theoretical deadlock when confronted with concrete political and social questions. Its defenders, however, do not regard it as an impossible union of opposites, but rather as a fruitful fusion of the virtues embodied in two great traditions of political thought.

This article seeks to elucidate the intrinsic contradictions of conservative liberalism not from the standpoint of a liberal or a conservative, but from the internal logic of the doctrine itself, while also emphasizing the necessity of a return to classical liberalism. These contradictions stem from two competing conceptions of social order:

Cosmos: an evolutionary and spontaneous order emerging from the decentralized actions of individuals, as developed within the classical liberal tradition, most notably in the work of Friedrich A. von Hayek.

Taxis: a designed, directed, and consciously structured order, even in its softer normative and regulative forms.

This article assumes that all the paradoxes discussed are expressions of a single underlying structural tension: the tension between trust in spontaneous order (Cosmos) and the normative impulse to preserve an idealized order (Taxis). Conservative liberalism, at the theoretical level, attempts to remain faithful to both simultaneously: it seeks to defend Cosmos while, at critical normative junctures, resorting to Taxis. This dual commitment constitutes the primary source of its contradictions.

The term “intrinsic contradiction” refers not merely to contingent inconsistencies or difficulties in policy-making. Rather, it refers to a deeper, structural incompatibility at the level of first principles—one in which full fidelity to either principle necessarily entails a departure from the other.

This critique is not directed solely at authoritarian strands of conservatism; it also extends to more moderate forms. The issue is not merely the defense of tradition per se, but the moment in which the “preservation” of tradition becomes a normative criterion for constraining spontaneous social evolution. From that point onward, conservatism—even in its most moderate formulation, namely Burkean conservatism—enters into an irreconcilable tension with the logic of liberalism.

In this article, these contradictions are examined at three levels: ontological, civilizational, and functional. The latter two levels are treated as concrete manifestations of the more fundamental ontological cleavage between Cosmos and Taxis.

Part I: Ontological Contradictions

1. The contradiction between spontaneous order (Cosmos) and purposive order (Taxis)

The most fundamental problem of conservative liberalism lies in the fact that, on the one hand, it regards customs, traditions, and historical institutions as products of social evolution, while on the other hand it classifies certain outcomes of that very evolutionary process as “desirable” and others as “deviations.” If customs and traditions are indeed the product of an evolutionary process, then future transformations must also be considered part of the same process and, as such, must be deemed legitimate. Normative resistance to them therefore amounts to a denial of the logic of Cosmos.

However, if certain traditions ought to be preserved because they are seen as carriers of a truth that transcends spontaneous evolutionary processes, then their defense necessarily requires a form of directed and purposive ordering—namely Taxis.

The normative prioritization of certain traditions over emerging transformations necessarily presupposes a form of judgment that lies outside the evolutionary order itself. The intrinsic contradiction of conservative liberalism is that it cannot simultaneously regard social evolution as the ultimate source of normative legitimacy and, at the same time, express a normative impulse to recalibrate the social order in response to outcomes of that very process which it deems undesirable.

2. The contradiction between individualism and social virtue

Liberalism is grounded in the principle that individuals have the right to define their own conception of the good and their preferred way of life, provided they do not infringe upon the rights of others. Conservatism, however, typically understands the good as something already given and pre-determined within tradition, virtue, and historical convention: what constitutes a good family? What is social virtue? Which culture is worthy of preservation?

But are individuals truly free to define the good for themselves, or is the good already embedded within tradition and therefore to be preserved? If the distinction between good and evil is fully delegated to individuals, and their liberty is recognized as primary, then the foundations of conservatism are fundamentally destabilized. Conversely, if the good is understood as a specific interpretation of tradition, and its identification is attributed not to individual judgment but to a collective will reflected in custom and social convention, then one departs from individualism as the core principle of liberalism.On this basis, conservative liberalism is placed in a tension between two opposing logics and cannot consistently embrace both at the same time.

3. The contradiction of criteria for “ideal” custom and tradition

Which historical configuration of custom within a given civilizational is considered desirable by conservative liberals? The present condition, which is itself the product of extensive historical transformations? Or earlier configurations of society that are presumed to have been degraded by the forces of modern change?

If the current condition—shaped by cumulative historical transformation—is regarded as the most desirable form of social custom and tradition, then why is there a persistent skepticism toward past transformations that produced it? Conversely, if earlier transformations are regarded as legitimate and beneficial, on what basis are subsequent transformations treated with suspicion? And if all prior transformations are themselves subject to critique, then to which historical point must one return in order to identify the “authentic” state of tradition?

Here the contradiction is not merely political, but epistemological: who holds the epistemic authority to distinguish between legitimate tradition and deviation? The key point is that any attempt to answer this question inevitably replaces Cosmos with Taxis.

Part II: Civilizational Contradictions

4. The contradiction between the minimal state and the virtue-preserving state

Conservative liberalism advocates a limited state, while at the same time assigning to that very state the role of safeguarding public morality, the family institution, and cultural cohesion. These two conceptions of the state are not mutually compatible. The “night-watchman state” is confined to the protection of rights. By contrast, a state tasked with the preservation of substantive moral order must necessarily engage in value judgments, identify deviations, and possess instruments for enforcing normative preferences. This entails a departure from the minimal state and represents another expression of the tension between Cosmos and Taxis.

5. The contradiction between universal rights and particularist identity

Liberalism rests on a universalist claim regarding liberty and rights. Conservatism, by contrast, is grounded in particular obligations to a historical community, national identity, and civilizational heritage. As long as these two logics remain aligned, no serious tension emerges. However, once they diverge—particularly in domains such as migration, border demarcation, minority rights, and competing national narratives—conservative liberalism is forced into a choice between two conflicting policy orientations, without being able to produce a coherent synthesis of the two perspectives.

If it affirms the universal principles of liberalism, it risks undermining its own conservative commitments. If, on the other hand, it privileges particularistic identity-based obligations as the primary criterion of decision-making, it departs from the shared normative foundations of liberalism. This is not merely a policy-level tension in public affairs, but a deeper philosophical contradiction that remains unresolved within the doctrine itself.

6. The contradiction between free markets and statism, in the context of Creative Destruction

Historically, liberalism emerged in opposition to the economic doctrines associated with conservatism, which often took the form of mercantilism. At its core, liberalism derives its meaning from opposition to state intervention in the economy, protectionist policies, tariffs, self-sufficiency strategies, and price controls. Conservatism, by contrast, is inherently concerned with preventing the market from escaping state oversight and control, and is continuously inclined toward institutional mechanisms designed to steer the economy toward a “correct” or socially desirable path. In this sense, liberal capitalism often ends up undermining precisely those socio-economic arrangements that conservatism seeks to preserve.

Even if conservative liberalism distances itself from economic interventionism and accepts the logic of free markets, it encounters a deeper paradox: the market is not merely a mechanism of exchange; it is simultaneously a civilizational process and a structurally disruptive one. The same force that generates wealth also transforms traditions. The logic of competition, innovation, and what is often described as “creative destruction” undermines not only inefficient firms, but also patterns of life, inherited hierarchies, traditional forms of authority, and even certain cultural foundations.It is here that conservative liberalism confronts a fundamental contradiction. If this dynamic, creative, and disruptive force of the market is accepted as legitimate, then the very traditions that conservatism seeks to preserve are gradually eroded. Conversely, if this dynamic must be constrained in order to preserve tradition, then economic liberty is restricted and the core logic of liberalism is violated.This paradox is not merely one between market and state; it is, more fundamentally, a tension between the self-organizing order of the market as Cosmos and the conservative impulse to stabilize social order as Taxis.

Part III: Functional Contradictions

7. The necessity of cultural engineering and the paradox of soft governance

Conservative liberals, in response to criticisms regarding their alleged inclination toward coercion in the preservation of customs and traditions, often appeal to cultural work and soft power as their preferred instruments of influence. The problem, however, arises when such cultural engineering is financed through public resources. In that case, it effectively entails the use of tax revenue—collected from citizens themselves—to impose a particular set of cultural preferences upon those same citizens, thereby raising a direct challenge to the liberal principles of property rights, non-coercion, and negative liberty.

The question, therefore, is how one can consistently uphold liberal principles while simultaneously using publicly funded instruments to shape the cultural norms and lifestyles of the population. Alternatively, if conservative liberals argue that cultural work should be financed exclusively through private resources, another dilemma emerges: whether the state can remain indifferent in the face of what it defines as “anti-normative” or socially disruptive cultural developments.

In either case, the outcome appears problematic. Either the state engages in normative cultural intervention, thereby contradicting liberal constraints on coercion, or it refrains from doing so, thereby abandoning its claimed role as a guardian of social values. This tension reveals yet another dimension of the intrinsic contradictions embedded within conservative liberalism.

8. The institution of the family and the paradox of voluntary contract

One of the issues that conservative liberalism strongly seeks to preserve is the continuity of the family as an institution, typically through formal marriage. It generally emphasizes the necessity of registering marriage either in legal or religious form. However, in dealing with individuals who choose not to comply with such a framework and maintain unregistered intimate relationships, its response tends to remain cautious and ambivalent.

If the state were to adopt coercive measures against those who refuse to formalize their relationships, it would be seen as interfering in a voluntary contract between two autonomous individuals, thereby violating their natural rights. Yet if it refrains from intervening altogether, it effectively abandons its conservative commitment to the preservation of the family as a social institution.

As a result, conservative liberalism, in the domain of family preservation, rarely moves beyond expressing concern over informal relationships and recommending their formalization. It remains suspended between a strictly liberal response and a fully conservative one, without being able to consistently adopt either.

Abortion and the Boundary Between Liberty and Value

In the case of abortion, as with formal marriage, the contradictions of conservative liberalism become clearly visible. Its proponents often regard abortion as inherently sinful and therefore tend to support its criminalisation. Yet this moral framing, once translated into a basis for legal intervention, places conservative liberalism in front of one of its deepest contradictions.On the one hand, insisting on such a position implies the disruption of parental autonomy—particularly the mother’s ownership over her own body—through state intervention. On the other hand, remaining silent on abortion means failing to protect the very principles and values it claims to uphold.This paradox also appears in discussions over cases such as pregnancies resulting from rape, foetal disability, and the determination of a “theologically defined” (rather than medically defined) threshold for when abortion may be considered permissible. These tensions ultimately reflect deeper residues of Taxis within the intellectual mindset of conservative liberals.

Conclusion

Conservative liberalism is less a coherent theoretical synthesis than a permanent suspension between two competing logics. On the one hand stands liberty as an emergent, self-generating order (Cosmos), and on the other, authority as the guardian of a desired order (Taxis).

Although conservative departures from earlier economic doctrines have brought these two traditions closer together in the economic sphere, conservatives nevertheless continue to accept an interventionist role for the state in economic life and seek to impose protectionist and directive policies on markets.

In the social and cultural domain as well, the paternalistic tendencies embedded in various strands of conservatism, along with its skepticism toward ongoing transformations in human civilization, remain in tension with the liberal worldview, in which liberty constitutes the central normative reference point.

As a result, the combination of these two traditions resembles less a third coherent alternative and more a field of unresolved contradictions for those who, while viewing liberalism as an Enlightenment project, remain constrained by concern over a rapidly transforming world from fully breaking with conservative orientations.

A return to classical liberalism—understood as a framework that affirms the gradual evolution of social institutions, while rejecting all forms of social engineering and rational constructivism—treats future transformations as part of the same decentralized and incremental process.

Within this perspective, individuals are recognised as having the right to preserve their family values, ancestral practices, and religious beliefs in the private sphere, and to prevent external interference with these rights within the boundaries of that sphere.

At the same time, classical liberalism does not attempt to elevate itself into an arbiter of civilisational progress by selecting “correct” traditions against “incorrect” ones. By refraining from such normative hierarchisation, it avoids transforming itself into a governing authority over the trajectory of civilization. In this sense, it enables the continuity of custom and tradition without recourse to coercion or the use of public resources.