Europe’s nuclear vulnerability

Europe is entering the fifth year of the war in Ukraine. Both sides are exhausted yet determined to continue. Russia retains greater resources, but Ukrainian defensive lines are holding. Negotiations occur intermittently, although neither side appears ready to conclude them. Russia benefits from Chinese backing, and U.S. support for Ukraine remains lukewarm. Europe lacks a coherent long-term strategy, and only seeks to prevent a Ukrainian defeat that would shift the confrontation with Russia across the Dnieper.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s domestic position remains secure, unlike that of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who faces growing political pressure.

When the Kremlin launched its full-scale invasion four years ago, it misjudged the situation. Moscow underestimated Ukrainian patriotism and resilience, and overestimated the effectiveness of its own armed forces. The expectation was a rapid victory similar to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This perception was reinforced by Washington’s last-minute offer to evacuate the Ukrainian government from Kyiv. President Putin anticipated Europe’s initial hesitancy and limited response, although the stronger European positions that emerged later in the war came as a surprise.

“In the West, the use of nuclear weapons is still widely considered inconceivable as a means of political pressure. Russia may attempt to challenge this assumption”.

 

The conflict has since evolved into a war of attrition with severe humanitarian and economic consequences.

Breaking the nuclear taboo

Europe is preparing its defense and strengthening NATO. These steps are necessary and appropriate, yet Moscow perceives them as a challenge. Conventionally, NATO is clearly superior to Russia. However, questions remain as to whether European politics has sufficient resolve to employ military force if required – and whether European populations are prepared to fight. The comfort-oriented mindset that has become dominant in European societies has contributed to a broad loss of healthy patriotism.

Russia is likely to rely on its nuclear superiority. It is also much more willing to escalate. This factor has long restrained European governments from providing stronger support to Ukraine and reinforces Europe’s desire to keep the war geographically contained. Such thinking, however, is short-sighted.

Europe will require short-term capabilities for credible nuclear deterrence and retaliation. In addition, defense against ballistic, including hypersonic, attacks is an immediate necessity. President Putin may wish to end the war, but only after achieving his objectives. Withdrawing from Ukraine without success is not an option in Moscow. Weakening Western support will be a strategic priority for the Kremlin.

In the West, the use of nuclear weapons is still widely considered inconceivable as a means of political pressure. Russia may attempt to challenge this assumption.

Support for Ukraine remains essential for both negotiation leverage and defense. While hopes persist that the bloodshed can be halted, policymakers must also realize that such efforts may fail. A de facto annihilation of Ukraine would critically harm the West and set a precedent with incalculable consequences.

A particularly grim scenario would involve Russia conducting a small-scale tactical nuclear strike against a European country without nuclear capability, accompanied by threats of further escalation. Such a move could intimidate and weaken willingness to resist expanding Russian influence across the continent.

A limited nuclear strike in Europe would be unlikely to trigger immediate American retaliation, thereby breaking the nuclear taboo. Two scenarios could follow. European countries may yield and withdraw their support from Ukraine because of the public sentiment.

Alternatively, strong and rapid investment in air defense could be undertaken, enabled by streamlined procurement rules and a broader shift in political and media discourse aimed at strengthening societal resilience and patriotism without generating panic or crude Russophobia. Such action would demonstrate resolve, restore credibility and strengthen deterrence.