Europe’s choice: Battlefield or great power

Ukraine is approaching its fourth year of war. The conflict is now only four months short of lasting as long as World War I. The Ukrainian people and government have fought bravely, showed resilience, tactical competence and were in many respects successful. Russia, however, remains stronger and has greater resources.

Support from the West, especially from Europe, was initially lukewarm. Many governments feared escalation by the Kremlin. As a result, Ukraine was not supplied with offensive weapons, allowing Russia to keep its logistics safely behind the lines. The initiative to escalate was effectively left to Moscow. Russia has the upper hand. It possesses superior resources, demographic depth and industrial capacity. Time works in Moscow’s favor.

Recently, Europe has become more assertive, even as it remains excluded from key negotiations, some of which are conducted solely between Moscow and Washington without Ukrainian participation.

Peace talks are intensifying, but the outcome remains highly uncertain. It is unclear whether even a ceasefire or agreement is being seriously envisaged. It is, however, more than likely that Ukraine will be forced to cede Crimea and territory in the east. NATO membership will almost certainly be off the table. Some form of security guarantees may be offered, though whether they will be worth the paper they are written on is highly questionable. EU membership, provided that NATO accession is explicitly excluded, may be acceptable to Moscow.

From a union of values to a union of interests

At the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Zelenskiy put forward a striking proposal: the creation of a European army with the strength of 3 million personnel. Its backbone would be the Ukrainian army, now the strongest in Europe after Russia, with 1 million battle-hardened soldiers. While other European countries would provide financing, Ukraine would contribute combat capability and technological experience. Such a force could serve as a long-term deterrent to Russia.

This is an intriguing idea, particularly as Europe could benefit from Ukraine’s highly developed, innovative and combat-experienced defense industry. It could form the core of an independent European defense industrial base.

Instead of clinging to abstract or superficial values, the driving force should be shared long-term interests in the economy, society and above all security.

 

The proposal, while certainly not aligned with Moscow’s interests, could give Europe strategic autonomy independent of NATO. At the same time, Moscow might perceive it as a provocation and respond with nuclear threats, potentially involving tactical nuclear weapons. Only decisive and farsighted leadership and strength would allow European countries to prevail in such a scenario.

The creation of a European army would make negotiations with Russia challenging. It would require tough talks, not necessarily conducted according to traditional diplomatic conventions, and would likely need to include guarantees of non-interference vis-a-vis Russia.

Independent of this proposal, Ukraine’s EU membership would need to be fast-tracked. This would have significant implications. The EU and its member states describe themselves as a “union of values,” but in practice the union is built on governance, procedures and rules. Fundamental principles such as self-responsibility, subsidiarity as well as economic and individual freedom have increasingly been marginalized by the expansion of welfare states and oversized public administrations. This mindset, shared by both national governments and Brussels, often obstructs economic, social and political common sense.

A rapid accession for Ukraine would require political realism. Instead of clinging to abstract or superficial values, the driving force should be shared long-term interests in the economy, society and above all security. Ukraine’s battlefield experience would strongly reinforce this security dimension. Fast-track accession could trigger a paradigm shift away from an increasingly centralized “ever closer union” toward a decentralized and deliberately “incomplete” union, one focused on global competitiveness, including defense.

Such a transformation into a union of interests could also foster healthy internal competition among member states, pushing governments to become more efficient, reduce regulation, privatize where appropriate and downsize public administration. This would align with the ideals of the EU’s early stages of integration, which were instrumental to Europe’s success. It would mean transforming a paralyzed “union of values” back into an effective “union of interests.”

This may sound utopian. Yet it is a coherent and achievable scenario, provided there is political courage and decisiveness.

The alternative is a continued confrontation between Europe and its eastern neighbor, marked by persistent instability, hybrid conflict, threats of war and ongoing nuclear blackmail. Ukraine could once again risk becoming a failed state caught between blocs. Europe could continue down its path toward global irrelevance and become a plaything in great-power politics.

As early as 1963, Archduke Otto von Habsburg published “Europe: Great Power or Battlefield,” in which he examined Europe’s geopolitical situation and argued that the re-emergence of Central Europe, including Ukraine, is essential to the continent’s future.

European leaders will therefore need to embrace pragmatism and realism grounded in facts and opportunities, rather than interpreting events to fit preconceived policies or ideologies.

This comment was originally published: https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/ukraine-eu/